Indonesia as Asean chairman: Navigating unchartered territory

The chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) is rotated alphabetically.

As for next year, Indonesia is set to helm the regional bloc.

Indeed, this has been the bloc’s norm, or standing order, which serves as the region’s diplomatic template since its inception in 1967.

As a matter of fact, Indonesia just hosted the G20 summit this year, as the region’s only member and the first in the region to host the exclusive club.

Under Indonesia’s presidency, it had successfully brought together the world’s leaders to discuss global issues involving trade, Taiwan, and of course, the fallout of the Russia-Ukraine war.

Come what may, as the region’s incoming new chair, Indonesia will be involved in strategic logistics, in particular, to host all 11 Asean Dialogue Partners (with the latest inclusion of the United Kingdom), to a multitude of Asean Summits, including the Asean Regional Forum in mid-2023, followed by the Asean Summit and East Asian Summit at the end of the year.

While this serves as a tall order for Indonesia, for it is not only a matter of logistics but also strategic nuances expected from member states and major powers like the United States and China.

First of all, President Joko Widodo, or popularly known as Jokowi, has the final say to shape the agenda. Would there be any breakthrough in the issue of Myanmar’s quagmire? As a chair, Indonesia walks a diplomatic tightrope over the issue.

Therein lies the conundrum. Since the brazen power grab by the Myanmar military last year, Asean has called for an immediate end of violence against civilians and urged to return to negotiating table involving all stakeholders, including the deposed leader, Aung San Su Kyi.

But all of these have been largely ignored by the junta, despite the military’s earlier lip service on a possible future visit to meet Suu Kyi, which yet to be materialised.

To date, Myanmar has seen ongoing violence with rising escalation, according to figures released by the Assistance Association of Political Prisoners.

The bloc has also designed a peace plan, called the Five-Point Consensus (5PC), but there is yet any substantial outcome.

Come what may, Indonesia faces high expectations to address the Myanmar crisis, given that the country is invariably described as the de facto leader of the bloc owing to its size and clout.

In the recent summit in Phnom Penh, Indonesia’s President Jokowi even called for a broadening of a standing ban on the Myanmar military’s top officials at the bloc’s gatherings.

In this vein, based on the basic groundwork laid by Cambodia as the previous chair, it is expected that Indonesia will continue to operationalize the peace plan, including leveraging on the position of the special envoy, and time will determine if a breakthrough is imminent.

Indeed, another lingering issue in the bloc is the South China Sea.

In retrospect, the South China Sea issue has long topped the region’s agenda.

This is given that the South China Sea is a resource-rich and strategically important water which crisscrossed by overlapping claims.

Back in 2022, both ASEAN and China signed a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DOC).

The declaration, among others, aims to manage rising tensions in the contested area.

However, over time, there were a number of vessel clashes and recurring encroachments in the strategic waterway.

Now, both sides have transposed the DOC into Code of Conduct (COC), an upgraded version of the DOC with a set of norms, rules and responsibilities to lessen the tension for conduct in the South China Sea.

But due to the pandemic, the negotiations were stalled.

After a two-year hiatus, negotiations on the COC are expected to resume next year under Indonesia’s chair.

But hurdles remain that the COC’s legal status is still far from being finalised.

Indeed, these issues are all Herculean tasks – which have to be framed by Indonesia, in close consultation with other senior officials in the region.

Moreover, Timor-Leste’s possible entry into the regional bloc under Indonesia's chairmanship would be symbolic.

In the words of its own President Ramos-Horta, “Timor-Leste will be a productive member of Asean, so we hope to join Asean during [the] Indonesian presidency. It will be highly symbolic”.

To be sure, Indonesia has long supported Timor-Leste’s bid for membership in Asean.

And in the recent summit in Phnom Penh, Asean leaders agreed “in principle” for Timor Leste to be admitted into the regional bloc as the 11th member state.

As of now, Timor Leste participates in the Asean meetings as an observer.

But member states are wary of the geopolitical implications too, as a result of Timor-Leste entry.

For one, Timor-Leste is in urgent need of developing its economy, human capital, bureaucracy, and government apparatus.

According to the Asian Development Bank, Timor Leste’s employed population only recorded less than US$1.90 in purchasing power per day in 2023

To which this has made the country more prone to major power influences, in return for economic benefits.

Indeed, it is important that Asean member states play a key role in providing appropriate assistance for Timor-Leste, hoping to lessen the country’s reliance on extra-regional players.

Singapore for instance, has committed to build up capacity of the country, and has announced to launch a special technical assistance Singapore-Timor Leste Asean Readiness Support (STARS) package.

The capacity building package priorities a number of areas, namely to enhance Asean knowledge and skills training, as well as education capacity building.

This serves as a good start, and it is hoped that other member states would follow suit.

Indeed, these are all political landmines that Indonesia has to manage, failing which could potentially rock the bloc’s boat.

But as Indonesia’s heavyweight diplomatic status in the region, added with its fresh experience hosting the G20 amid Russia-Ukraine war and intense geopolitical pressure, Indonesia stands a chance for scoring a back-to-back win with a successful chairmanship of Asean in 2023, granted that all the issues above are addressed effectively.

Nik Luqman is an analyst and writer focused on Southeast Asia. Currently, he is attached to the Institute of Malaysian and International Studies, National University of Malaysia as Associate Fellow. He tweets at @Nluqman.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of Sinar Daily.